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Abstract—In this paper we show that the logical framework
proposed by Becker et al. [1] to reason about security policy
behavior in a trust management context can be captured by an
operational framework that is based on the language proposed
by Miller in 1989 to deal with scoping and/or modules in logic
programming. The framework of Becker et al. uses proposi-
tional Horn clauses to represent both policies and credentials,
implications in clauses are interpreted in counterfactual logic, a
Hilbert-style proof system is defined and a system based on SAT is
used to prove whether properties about credentials, permissions
and policies are valid, i.e. true under all possible policies. Our
contributions in this paper are three. First, we show that this kind
of validation can rely on an operational semantics (derivability
relation) of a language very similar to Miller’s language, which is
very close to derivability in logic programs. Second, we are able
to establish that, as in propositional logic, validity of formulas
is a co-NP-complete problem. And third, we present a provably
correct implementation of a goal-oriented algorithm for validity.
Index Terms—Trust Management Systems, Semantics, Answer
Set Programming, Logic Programs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Trust Management Systems (TMS) [2] are perhaps the most
common models to describe distributed access control. In these
types of models, there are (1) policies that define under what
conditions a subject is able to access resources, (2) credentials
provided by the subject in order to fulfill policies and (3)
decisions as to whether a subject has particular permissions.
One of the most popular ways to describe TMS is to use logic
programming and Datalog-like languages for the definition
of policies and credentials (see for example [3], [4], [5],
[6]). Then, permissions are decided by inferences combining
policies and credentials.
Working under this framework, Becker et al. [1] have re-
cently proposed a logic system in which one can reason about
TMS in general. In this system, a Hilbert-style axiomatization
is defined and SAT solvers are used to prove TMS properties.
In their logic, policies and credentials are propositional logic
programs, while permissions are propositional Boolean formu-
las. Trust management behavior, i.e. to determine whether a
permission p is true under a policy P when presented with a
set of credentials Q, is captured by proving that the statement
Q p holds in the policy P. This statement is true if p holds
in the policy P extended with those clauses in the credentials
Q: P∪Q ` p.
Example 1.1: To illustrate how policies, credentials and
permissions are expressed, let us consider a very simple
example about purchasing digital goods. The policy of the
seller is:
X .paid(Music,1.99)⊃ X .download(Music)
veri f y(paypal,X ,V )⊃ paypal(X ,V )
veri f y(wire,X ,V )⊃ wire transfer(X ,V )
These statements represent schemes of policies that will be
applied to specific values of the arguments. The statements
say that if X paid 1.99 as fee for the music Music, X is able
to download Music, that there are two ways in which X can
pay a fee V , either by means of PayPal or by means of a wire
transfer and that these payments can be verified by calling an
external procedure. Credentials for paying the fee presented by
a subject alice to request download permission can be written
as follows:1
{ paypal(alice,1.99)⊃ alice.paid(song,1.99)
veri f y(paypal,alice,1.99)
}alice.download(song)
To allow the subject alice to download the song, the policy
and the two credentials
paypal(alice,1.99)⊃ alice.paid(song,1.99)
veri f y(paypal,alice,1.99)
must be joined by the system in a single theory and then
the system verifies that the permission alice.download(song)
holds in the expanded theory.
The important contribution of Becker et al.’s work is the
definition of valid formulas in TMS. Informally, these are
formulas that are true regardless of the policies and credentials
that can be defined in the TMS. With this definition in hand,
they are able to describe how to approach proofs such as
1We make the simplifying assumption that no third party is involved in the
TMS and that alice gets a signed certificate from PayPal.
probing attacks (i.e. discovering policies) for a given instance
of a TMS, or general properties such as the transitivity of
credential-based derivations.
The authors, however, argue that Hilbert style axiomatiza-
tions are difficult for finding proofs because the proofs are
not goal-oriented. Hence, they resort to an algorithm that
interleaves syntactic transformations of formulas and calls to
SAT solvers in order to do automatic verification. In their paper
there is an argument but not a proof that the verification is
sound and complete. The authors implied that the proof is very
involved and they said that part of the proof of correctness was
done using automatic verification tools.
In this work we show that the logical framework proposed
by Becker et al. can be captured by an operational framework
that is based on a language proposed by Miller in 1989 to deal
with scoping and/or modules in logic programming and later
extended with negation by Pasarella et al. [7]. Our contribution
is to show that we can rely on the operational semantics (deriv-
ability relation) of Miller’s and Pasarella et al.’s languages,
which are very close to derivability in logic programs, to do
goal-oriented formula verification. Furthermore, our proofs are
much simpler because we are able to use previous results from
logic programming. More specifically, the proximity to logic
programs gets us two results. We are able to show that as
in propositional logic, validity of formulas in TMS is co-
NP-complete, answering an open question left by Becker et
al. And second, we are able to provide a provably correct
implementation of a goal-oriented validity check algorithm
based on logic programs under the stable model semantics [8].
The connection to logic programs also opens the possibility
of extending Becker et al.’s framework to the more practical
first-order case since Miller’s and Pasarella et al.’s languages
are first order.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II first
introduces Becker et al.’s TMS logic framework (Sec. II-A),
and then our framework is presented and the equivalence is
shown (Sec. II-B to II-D). In Section III the complexity of
verifying validity is established. Section IV describes how a
validity algorithm can be implemented using logic programs
under the Answer Set Programming semantics. In sections V
and VI a few applications are discussed and some final remarks
are presented.
II. REASONING IN TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
A. Becker et al. trust management systems
In this section we recall some definitions and main results
from the trust management logical framework defined by
Becker et al. [1], and althought the axiom schemas and
inference rules of the proof system in this framework are
not required to understand this paper, they can be found in
Appendix A. First, from a syntactic point of view, Becker et
al. define (1) a Datalog-like trust management language, (2)
a derivability relation and, (3) in order to establish universal
truths, a notion of validity based on this derivability relation.
Second, semantically, a counterfactual Kripke model theory
for trust management is introduced, as well as a notion of
validity in terms of these models. It is also shown that the
syntactic and semantic definitions of validity are equivalent
(see Theorem IV.11 in [1]). Finally, a proof theory with a
Hilbert-style axiomatization is defined and it is shown that the
aximatization is sound and complete with respect to the Kripke
semantics (see Theorem V.3, in [1]). Accordingly, the notion of
validity, denoted by `ϕ, in the proof theory is equivalent to the
notion of validity in the model theory and, as a consequence
of Theorems IV.11 and V.3, equivalent to the notion of validity
defined on the derivability relation.
In addition to the logic-based trust management framework,
another contribution of Becker et al.’s work is a procedure to
decide whether a formula is valid or not. This procedure is
obtained by “mechanizing” the logic in two main steps: (i)
translating trust management formulas into a series of classical
propositional formulas and (ii) using a standard SAT solver to
verify the satisfiability of those formulas. Despite the empirical
evidence about its functionality that is given in the paper,
step (i) is somewhat involved because it needs to do some
intermediate calls to a SAT solver to do some checks before
getting the propositional formulas.
In the remainder of this section, we present those definitions
from [1] that we need in our work. In this work the existence
of an underlying signature Σ which consists of a countable
set of propositional atoms is assumed. As is usual in logic
programming and Datalog, a Σ-clause is an expression of
the form p :- p1, . . . , pn where n ≥ 0 and p, p1, . . . , pn, are Σ-
atoms. The atom p and the sequence of atoms p1, . . . , pn are
called the head and the body of the clause, respectively. A
Σ-policy γ is defined as a finite set of Datalog Σ-clauses [9].
Whenever n= 0, the clause is denoted by p. For instance, the
fact “Maria can download the music file Happy” is represented
by a propositional atom in this language. The set of all Σ-
policies is denoted by Γ. In the rest of this section, when it is
clear from the context, we drop the prefix Σ- . To establish if
an atom p is derivable from a policy γ, a derivability relation,
 is defined as follows.
γ p if and only if
(i) p ∈ γ, or
(ii) ∃p :- p1, . . . , pn ∈ γ,n≥ 0 and
∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} : γ pi
This derivability is extended to deal with the relation between
policies and classical propositional compound formulas that
can be formed using atoms, including the constant true, and
the non-logical symbols ∧ and ¬. As in logic programs, we
will call atoms and their negation literals. Atoms are called
positive literals and negated atoms are called negative literals.
Compound formulas will be denoted by ϕ (with subindexes
when necessary). Thus, the relation  is extended as follows.
(iii) γ true
(iv) γ ¬ϕ if and only if γ 6 ϕ
(v) γ ϕ1∧ϕ2 if and only if γ ϕ1 and γ ϕ2
and γ ϕ is read as “ϕ holds in the policy γ.” As in Datalog,
this definition interprets negation using the minimal model of
the policy. Furthermore, without Σ-credentials (which will be
introduced in the next paragraph), the derivability relation 
is equivalent to derivability in Datalog, `Datalog. Then, given a
formula ϕ, a policy γ and its minimal model Mγ, γ ϕ if and
only if ϕ holds in Mγ (γ `Datalog ϕ). The minimal model Mγ is
the smallest set such that Mγ = {p | p is a Σ-atom and Mγ |=
γ}.
To reason about the interaction between policies and cre-
dentials, Becker et al. also represent credentials as finite sets of
clauses and extend the syntax of queries to formalize dynamic
credential submissions. This interaction is represented by (trust
management) formulas of the form γϕ and the derivability
relation is extended as follows:
(vi) γγ1ϕ if and only if γ∪γ1  ϕ (1)
Intuitively this means that given a policy γ, a credential (set
of clauses) γ1 and a formula ϕ, once the credential γ1 has been
submitted, the formula ϕ is checked against both the policy γ
and the credential γ1, γ∪γ1.
The (operational) notion of validity based on the derivability
relation  is the following. A formula ϕ is valid, denoted by
 ϕ, if and only if for every policy γ, γ ϕ. It is worth noting
that the symbol  ϕ corresponds to a unary relation and it is
not equivalent to the standard reading: /0 ϕ. Indeed, when
it has two arguments, a policy and a formula, it has to be
interpreted as the derivability relation but when it is unary it
represents the validity of a formula.
B. Adapting Miller’s logic program modules to TMS
We will denote our operational framework to reason about
policies, credentials and permissions by Oˆ-TMS. The Oˆ-TMS
framework is based on the language introduced by Miller in
[10]. In his language, the semantics is presented in terms of
a derivation relation over sequents. A sequent is a pair of the
form P `M G, where P is a logic program with modules (i.e.
sub-programs) called the antecedent and G a goal or query
that might also include modules called the succedent. To pass a
module Q as part of a query G, the query will look like Q⊃G′.
Given a program P, to prove the query Q⊃G′ it is necessary
to prove G with the program P∪Q. This is formalized in [10]
using the following inference rule:
P∪Q `M G
P `M Q⊃ G
Considering that programs are sets of clauses that represent
policies and credentials, and goals are clauses that represent
general formulas, the intuitive interpretation of this rule is the
same as (1). The difference is that Miller allows modules
in P (i.e. P could be of the form {q ⊃ p∧ r ⊃ p} ⊃ s) and
we will not. As in regular logic programs and in TMS, the
Oˆ-TMS framework assumes the existence of an underlying
propositional signature Σ of Σ-atoms. In the rest of the paper
we adopt a notation quite similar to Miller’s notation.
Definition 2.1: Policies, clauses and goals are defined by the
following BNF grammar, where A, F , C, P and G range over
(1) atoms, conjunctions of atoms, (2) clauses, (3) policies and
(4) goals, respectively.
(1) F ::= true | A | F ∧F
(2) C ::= F ⊃ A
(3) P ::=C |C;P
(4) G ::= F | ¬G | P⊃ G | G∧G | G∨G
For the sake of simplicity, in the following, we omit the
prefix Σ- and assume that Σ is given by the atoms appearing
in the policies and goals. In Miller’s terms, policies are called
programs. In this paper we consider the terms equivalent.
A goal is either an expression of the form P ⊃ G, where
P is a policy and (inductively) G is a goal, or an expression
corresponding to a propositional formula built with the stan-
dard connectives ¬, ∧ and ∨. Intuitively, a policy in a goal
represents a credential. A more formal description will follow
but we want to observe first that our goals are the formulas or
queries in Becker et al.’s framework. We also note that Becker
et al. use two different notations for ⊃, one to define clauses
in a policy (:-) and a second one to introduce credentials in
goals (). We follow Miller and use a single operator since
their semantics are equivalent.
As usual, we define classical implication, G1 → G2, as
¬G1∨G2 and equivalence, G1↔ G2, as (G1→ G2)∧ (G2→
G1). Throughout the rest of the paper, we adopt the following
conventions: P and Q denote programs or policies. Clauses
may be enclosed in parenthesis. A clause of the form true⊃ p
is simply written as p. Additionally, as in logic programming,
clauses of the form A1∧A2∧ ·· ·∧Ak ⊃ A, k ≥ 1 are denoted
by A1,A2, . . . ,Ak ⊃ A.
Definition 2.2 (Oˆ-proof rules): The inference rules for
sequents in Oˆ-TMS are defined over Programs×Goals in
Table I.
Before presenting the definitions of proofs and proof trees
we would like to make a few remarks about the inference
rules. All rules except for NHYP are from Miller’s module sys-
tem [10]. NHYP deals with negation over ⊃. Miller introduces
negation in the form of constraints: G⊃⊥. Thus, the negation
of a goal becomes a clause and he adds it to the program. Then,
what needs to be proved is that these constraint clauses do
not introduce any inconsistency, i.e. P 6`M⊥ when P contains
constraints. For proofs, he treats the symbol ⊥ as if it were
another atom, therefore, we can deduce from the SLD rule that
if P `M G then P `M⊥ since G ⊃⊥∈ P. Now assume that G
is of the form Q ⊃ G′. In this case, from the HYP inference
rule we get that if P∪Q `M G′ then P `M⊥. Therefore, to
avoid inconsistencies, it must be the case that P∪Q 6`M G′.
Informally speaking, we could say that we want ¬G′ to hold
according to the minimal model semantics in P∪Q. This is the
intuition behind the NHYP inference rule and it first appeared
in a more generalized first order form in [11] (see also [12] for
a comprehensive discussion of modules in logic programs with
negation). The corresponding version of this rule in Becker’s
et al. framework is captured by the following axiom schema
of their proof system:
`γ¬ϕ ←→ ¬γϕ
Definition 2.3: (Oˆ-TMS basics)
1) An Oˆ-sequent is a sequent of the form P `Oˆ G.
2) An initial sequent is a sequent of the form P`Oˆ G where
G is a negative literal that is true in the minimal model,
MP, of P or a sequent of the form P `Oˆ true.
3) An Oˆ-tree for P`Oˆ G is a tree in which nodes are labeled
with sequents such that (i) the root node is labeled with
P `Oˆ G and (ii) the internal nodes are instances of one
of the inference rules in Definition 2.2.
4) An Oˆ-proof for P `Oˆ G is an Oˆ-tree for P `Oˆ G in which
all leaf nodes are labeled with initial sequents.
5) The Oˆ-frontier of an Oˆ-tree T for P `Oˆ G, denoted
by F (T ), is the set that contains all the leaves of T .
Whenever T is an Oˆ-proof, F (T ) is a successful Oˆ-
frontier. Otherwise, F (T ) is a failed Oˆ-frontier.
For the sake of simplicity, in what follows we drop the
prefix Oˆ- when it is not necessary.
The rules above are the inference rules used for the trust
management system in order to make decisions about per-
missions. In Fig. 1 we can see an Oˆ-tree of /0 `Oˆ G, where
G = {q ; r ⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a∧{r ; q⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a∧{r ; q} ⊃ a. Let us
call this Oˆ-tree T . The frontier of T ,
F (T ) = {{q ; r ⊃ a} `Oˆ ¬a, {r ; q⊃ a} `Oˆ ¬a, {r ; q} `Oˆ a}
is a failed frontier since not all its elements are initial sequents.
C. Oˆ-Validity
A fundamental notion in Becker et al.’s logical framework
for TMS is the definition of validity of a formula [1]. A
formula ϕ is valid if and only if it holds in all policies.
This is equivalent to saying that ϕ is a universal truth.
Intuitively, from the TMS point of view, a valid formula ϕ
represents a query for a permission such that no matter which
policy is considered, the permission will be granted given the
appropriate credentials.
Since our inference rules are goal-oriented, our notion of
validity will be based on the idea of not being able to find a
counterexample. In other words, our definition uses the fact
that, if a goal G is valid, then there cannot exist a policy from
which its negation, ¬G, can be proved. As we will see below,
this definition will suggest a refutation procedure [13] to prove
the validity of a goal.
Definition 2.4: Let G be a goal and ΣG be the signature
formed by the set of propositional atoms occurring in G. G is
valid, `Oˆ G, in the Oˆ-TMS if and only if it is not possible to
find a ΣG-policy ∆ such that ∆ `Oˆ ¬G
As we will see in the next section, our definition of validity
in TMS is equivalent to Becker et al.’s definition.
Example 2.1: We now illustrate how Definition 2.4 can be
used to prove the validity of the formula from Example V.4. of
[1]: let G be (¬a∧(d ⊃¬e)∧(a⊃ b∧c⊃ d)⊃ e)→ (c∧(d ⊃
a)) where ΣG = {a,b,c,d,e}.
Following Definition 2.4, `Oˆ G if and only if it is not possible
to find a ΣG-policy ∆ such that ∆ `Oˆ ¬G. Hence, we would
have to prove that there is no ∆ such that
∆ `Oˆ ¬((¬a∧d ⊃ ¬e∧ (a⊃ b∧ c⊃ d)⊃ e)→ c∧d ⊃ a)
This is (classically) equivalent to:
∆ `Oˆ ¬a∧ (d ⊃ ¬e)∧ ((a⊃ b∧ c⊃ d)⊃ e)∧ (¬c∨¬(d ⊃ a))
Distributing ∧ over ∨ we obtain that we have to prove there
is no ∆ in the following two cases:
1) ∆ `Oˆ ¬a∧ (d ⊃ ¬e)∧ (a⊃ b∧ c⊃ d)⊃ e∧¬c
a) ∆ `Oˆ ¬a, ∆ `Oˆ ¬c: Since we are looking for a
counter-example, we need to make these sequents
initial sequents, so we have to find a policy ∆ such
that a does not belong to its minimal model, M∆.
Similarly it must be the case for c. Observe that
the scoping of any ∆ will be the whole formula.
b) ∆ `Oˆ d ⊃ ¬e: if and only if ∆∪{d} `Oˆ ¬e and
this must become an initial sequent. That is, e /∈
M∆∪{d}.
c) ∆ `Oˆ (a ⊃ b∧ c ⊃ d) ⊃ e: if and only if ∆∪{a ⊃
b;c⊃ d} `Oˆ e but this is not possible since from 1b
¬e must hold in M∆ and from 1a the new clauses
cannot help with the proof since ¬a and ¬c must
also hold in M∆.
Therefore, there is no ∆ such that ∆ `Oˆ ¬a∧ d ⊃ ¬e∧
(a⊃ b∧ c⊃ d)⊃ e∧¬c
2) ∆ `Oˆ ¬a∧ d ⊃ ¬e∧ (a ⊃ b∧ c ⊃ d) ⊃ e∧¬(d ⊃ a). In
this case, directly by item 1c above we get that such ∆
does not exist.
Since we cannot construct a (counter-example) policy for ¬G,
`Oˆ G.
The next example illustrates a proof of a very simple non-
valid formula.
Example 2.2: Let G = b∧ c→ a be a goal. In this case, to
prove that b∧ c→ a is valid, we would have to prove that
there is no ∆ such that ∆ `Oˆ ¬(b∧ c→ a). This means that
there is no ∆ such as ∆ `Oˆ b∧ c∧¬a. But we can see that
∆= {b,c} allows us to prove b∧ c→ a and hence, b∧ c→ a
is not valid.
Notice that our proof is constructive. We provide a coun-
terexample for the validity of b ∧ c → a. That is, we find
evidence that ¬(b∧ c→ a) is satisfiable. This fact suggests
that we could use a procedure to find this set of rules as an
intermediate step to prove the validity of a formula. We will
present the implementation of such a procedure in Section
TABLE I
Oˆ- PROOF RULES
P `Oˆ F
P `Oˆ A
∃F ⊃ A ∈ P (SLD) P `Oˆ Gi
P `Oˆ G1 ∨G2
i = 1,2 (OR)
P `Oˆ G1 P `Oˆ G2
P `Oˆ G1 ∧G2
(AND)
P∪Q `Oˆ G
P `Oˆ Q⊃ G
(HYP)
P `Oˆ Q⊃ ¬G
P `Oˆ ¬(Q⊃ G)
(NHYP)
P `Oˆ A
P `Oˆ ¬¬A
(DNEG)
P `Oˆ ¬G1 ∨¬G2
P `Oˆ ¬(G1 ∧G2)
(DMAND)
P `Oˆ ¬G1 ∧¬G2
P `Oˆ ¬(G1 ∨G2)
(DMOR)
{q ; r ⊃ a} `Oˆ ¬a
/0 `Oˆ {q ; r ⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a
{r ; q⊃ a} `Oˆ ¬a
/0 `Oˆ {r ; q⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a
{r ; q} `Oˆ a
/0 `Oˆ {r ; q} ⊃ a
/0 `Oˆ {q ; r ⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a∧{r ; q⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a∧{r ; q} ⊃ a
Fig. 1. An Oˆ-tree of /0 `Oˆ {q ; r ⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a∧{r ; q⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a∧{r ; q} ⊃ a
∆∪{q ; r ⊃ a} `Oˆ ¬a
∆ `Oˆ {q ; r ⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a
∆∪{r ; q⊃ a} `Oˆ ¬a
∆ `Oˆ {r ; q⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a
∆∪{r ; q} `Oˆ true
∆∪{r ; q} `Oˆ r
∆∪{r ; q} `Oˆ true
∆∪{r ; q} `Oˆ q
∆∪{r ; q} `Oˆ a
∆ `Oˆ {r ; q} ⊃ a
∆∪ /0 `Oˆ {q ; r ⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a∧{r ; q⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a∧{r ; q} ⊃ a
Fig. 2. An Oˆ-proof of /0 `Oˆ {q ; r ⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a∧{r ; q⊃ a} ⊃ ¬a∧{r ; q} ⊃ a where ∆= {r,q⊃ a}
III. In summary, whenever no such counterexample exists for
some formula G (that is, there is no ∆ such that ∆ `Oˆ ¬G), it
means that G is Oˆ-valid, `Oˆ G.
D. Equivalence of Oˆ-TMF and Becker et al.’s TMS
Let us start with the following lemma that establishes the
equivalence of both derivability relations.
Lemma 2.1: Let Q⊃ G be a goal. Then, for all policies P
P Q⊃ G if and only if P `Oˆ Q⊃ G
The proof follows by induction, showing that P 
Q1 . . .Qk G if and only if P `Oˆ Q1 ⊃ . . .Qk ⊃ G using the
definition of  and the HYP rule in Table I. As a corollary
we also have
P G if and only if P `Oˆ G (2)
Now, we use Theorem V.3 in [1] that establishes the
equivalence between their derivability and their proof system.
Given a goal G,
 G if and only if ` G (3)
Theorem 2.1: Let G be a goal. Then,
` G if and only if `Oˆ G
Proof: From (2) and (3) it follows that ` G if and only
if  G if and only if `Oˆ G.
III. COMPLEXITY OF CHECKING VALIDITY
Definition 2.4 suggests a proof procedure for validity. If we
want to find out if a goal G′ is valid we can implement the
following refutation algorithm:
Algorithm 3.1:
INPUT: A program P and a goal G
OUTPUT: ∆⊆ clauses(Σ) or f ail
1) Find ∆⊆ clauses(Σ). such that P∪∆ `Oˆ G holds.
2) If ∆ exists return ∆. Otherwise, return fail.
and run it with P= /0 and G=¬G′. If the program returns fail
G′ is valid; otherwise is not. This algorithm terminates since
clauses(Σ) is finite. However, at first glance the complexity
can be high since even though one can show that Oˆ-proofs
are polynomial with respect to the size of the program P plus
the size of the goal G, the size of ∆ can be exponentially larger
than the size of P plus G. In the remainder of this section we
will refine the algorithm to prove that the problem of finding
∆ is NP-complete and, therefore, that proving validity is co-
NP-complete. This is done by showing that there is always a
∆ that is not much larger than the size of the program plus
the goal (if one can be found).
Before getting into the details of the algorithm and the proof
let us go over a few examples. Note that if in the example of
{r ⊃ q} `Oˆ a
/0 `Oˆ {r ⊃ q} ⊃ a
{s} `Oˆ ¬a
/0 `Oˆ {s} ⊃ ¬a
/0 `Oˆ {r ⊃ q} ⊃ a∧{s} ⊃ ¬a
Fig. 3. An Oˆ-tree of /0 `Oˆ {r ⊃ q} ⊃ a∧{s} ⊃ ¬a
∆∪{r ⊃ q} `Oˆ true
∆∪{r ⊃ q} `Oˆ r
∆∪{r ⊃ q} `Oˆ q
∆∪{r ⊃ q} `Oˆ a
∆ `Oˆ {r ⊃ q} ⊃ a
∆∪{s} `Oˆ ¬a
∆ `Oˆ {s} ⊃ ¬a
∆∪ /0 `Oˆ {r ⊃ q} ⊃ a∧{s} ⊃ ¬a
Fig. 4. An Oˆ-proof of /0 `Oˆ {r ⊃ q} ⊃ a∧{s} ⊃ ¬a where ∆= {r ; q⊃ a}
Fig. 1 we make ∆= {r,q⊃ a} and add it to the antecedent of
each sequent in the Oˆ-tree, it becomes the Oˆ-proof of Fig. 2.
This example shows that ∆ may need to include clauses with
more than one atom in the body.
The example in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 illustrates that ∆ may
contain several clauses that need to be used in a single proof.
Our last example in Fig. 5 shows that ∆ may also have more
than one clause with the same atom in the head. For G =
(b ⊃ (¬c∧ a))∧ (c ⊃ (¬b∧ a))∧¬a, the simplest ∆ that can
be found is {b⊃ a ; c⊃ a}.
To show that the problem of deciding whether ∆ exists is
in NP we will show first that if such a ∆ exists then there is
one whose size is at most polynomially larger than the size of
the program plus the size of the goal.
We will need the following definition in our algorithm.
Definition 3.1: A potential Oˆ-proof for (P,G) is a tree T
in which nodes are labeled with sequents such that (i) the
root node is labeled with P `Oˆ G, (ii) the internal nodes are
instances of Oˆ-proof inference rules and (iii) the leaf nodes are
labeled with potential initial sequents. Potential initial sequents
are either initial sequents of the form P′ `Oˆ true or P′ `Oˆ
¬A or sequents of the form P′ `Oˆ A where A is an atom for
which none of the Oˆ-proof inference rules can be applied. The
frontier of a potential Oˆ-proof T , F (T ), is the set of potential
initial sequents not having the form P′ `Oˆ true.
Notice that the Oˆ-tree in Fig. 1 is a potential Oˆ-proof.
Let
F (P,G) = {F (T ) |T is an Oˆ-tree of (P,G)}
It is easy to show that the following algorithm non-
deterministically decides the existence of a ∆:
Algorithm 3.2:
INPUT: The program P and the goal G
OUTPUT: yes or fail
1) Choose F in F (P,G) and ∆⊆ clauses(Σ)\P
2) If for every Pi `Oˆ `i ∈ F , Pi∪∆ `Datalog `i holds return
yes
3) Otherwise, return fail.
In other words, after finding the frontiers the problem
is transformed into finding proofs in propositional Datalog.
Based on this algorithm we can show the polynomial bound
on the size of ∆.
Lemma 3.1: Given a program P and a goal G. If there is
a ∆′ ⊆ clauses(Σ) such that P∪∆′ `Oˆ G holds then there is a
∆⊆ clauses(Σ) such that P∪∆ `Oˆ G holds and |∆| ≤ |G|×|Σ|2
Proof: From Alg. 3.2 we know there is an F in F (P,G)
such that for every Pi `Oˆ `i ∈ F , Pi∪∆′ `Datalog `i holds.
Observe that the size of any F in F (P,G) is bounded by the
size of G. Hence, the number of Pis is never more than |G|.
Furthermore, every Pi contains P and cannot grow more than
the size of G. Therefore, |Pi| ≤ |P|+ |G|. Take now any Pi
and first assume that `i is a positive literal. Select from ∆′
a minimal subset ∆i ⊆ ∆′ needed to show Pi∪∆i `Datalog `i
holds. Because Pi∪∆i is a propositional Datalog program
there cannot be two different clauses in ∆i with the same
propositional variable in the head of the clause; otherwise ∆i
will not be minimal – this is because there are no disjunctions
in a Datalog program. This property limits the number of
clauses in ∆i to a maximum of |Σ| and the size of each clause
to be no larger than |Σ| as well since otherwise an atom repeats
in the body of the rule and can be removed. Hence, |∆i| ≤ |Σ|2.
Let ∆ be the union of these minimal ∆is. Again, because Pi∪∆′
is propositional Datalog, for any ∆′′ ⊆ ∆′ and for any negative
`, if Pi∪∆′ `Datalog ` holds then Pi∪∆′′ `Datalog ` also holds
since the minimal model of Pi∪∆′′ will always be a (not
necessarily proper) subset of the minimal model of Pi∪∆′.
Given that ∆⊆ ∆′, then for every Pi `Oˆ `i ∈ F , Pi∪∆ `Datalog `i
holds. And |∆| ≤ |G|× |Σ|2.
Now we can show that deciding the existence of a ∆ is
NP-Complete.
Theorem 3.1: Given a program P and a goal G, deciding if
there is a ∆ such that P∪∆ `Oˆ G holds is NP-complete.
Proof: Using Alg. 3.2 and limiting the size of ∆ to be no
more than |G| × |Σ|2 we can check in polynomial time with
respect to the size of |P|+ |G| that P∪∆ `Oˆ G holds since
guessing an F in F (P,G) can be done in linear time with
respect to |G|, and the fact that checking that Pi∪∆ `Datalog `i
holds is also polynomial in the size of |Pi∪∆| (see [14]). This
shows that the problem is NP.
It is easy to see that if one takes any instance of SAT and
sets it as G and sets P = /0, a satisfying assignment can be
extracted from any ∆ returned by Alg. 3.2. If such a ∆ does
not exist then the instance is not satisfiable.
Corollary 3.1: Checking validity of a formula in TMS is
co-NP-complete.
Proof: Follows from Theorem 3.1 and the fact that valid
propositional formulas are also valid TMS formulas.
{b} `Oˆ ¬c {b} `Oˆ a
{b} `Oˆ ¬c∧a
/0 `Oˆ {b} ⊃ ¬c∧a
{c} `Oˆ ¬b {c} `Oˆ a
{c} `Oˆ ¬b∧a
/0 `Oˆ {c} ⊃ ¬b∧a /0 `Oˆ ¬a
/0 `Oˆ ({b} ⊃ ¬c∧a)∧ ({c} ⊃ ¬b∧a)∧¬a
Fig. 5. An Oˆ-tree of /0 `Oˆ ({b} ⊃ ¬c∧a)∧ ({c} ⊃ ¬b∧a)∧¬a
∆∪{b} `Oˆ ¬c
∆∪{b} `Oˆ true
∆∪{b} `Oˆ b
∆∪{b} `Oˆ a
∆∪{b} `Oˆ ¬c∧a
∆ `Oˆ {b} ⊃ ¬c∧a
∆∪{c} `Oˆ ¬b
∆∪{c} `Oˆ true
∆∪{c} `Oˆ c
∆∪{c} `Oˆ a
∆∪{c} `Oˆ ¬b∧a
∆ `Oˆ {c} ⊃ ¬b∧a ∆ `Oˆ ¬a
∆∪ /0 `Oˆ ({b} ⊃ ¬c∧a)∧ ({c} ⊃ ¬b∧a)∧¬a
Fig. 6. An Oˆ-proof of /0 `Oˆ ({b} ⊃ ¬c∧a)∧ ({c} ⊃ ¬b∧a)∧¬a where ∆= {b⊃ a ; c⊃ a}
IV. IMPLEMENTING ALG. 3.2
We can take advantage of the fact that in Alg. 3.2 proofs
are reduced to proofs in logic programs to use logic pro-
grams as an implementation. Finding a frontier is an easy
process so we concentrate on generating ∆. For this we
proceed as follows. Let us consider a frontier F ∈ F (P,G),
F = {P1 `Oˆ `1, . . . ,Pn `Oˆ `n}. Here we want to find a ∆ such
that Pi∪∆ `Datalog `i holds for every i. Note that if `i = true
there is nothing to prove. Let us assume that after removing
those sequents we are left with k proofs. We do a simple
transformation to each Pi and `i to get a new P′i and a new
`′i such that if we find a ∆′ for which P′1∪·· ·∪P′k∪∆′ `Datalog
`′1∧ ·· ·∧ `′k we can easily get ∆ from ∆′. In other words, we
will work with a single propositional logic program to find ∆.
For this, we will use the Answer Set Programming framework
(ASP). Programs in ASP are very general logic programs [8],
[15], but we will limit our description to Datalog programs
extended with negation, often called Datalog¬. More precisely,
a propositional Datalog¬ program is a finite set of clauses of
the form p :- p1, . . . , pn,not q1, . . . ,not qm, n ≥ 0, m ≥ 0. If
n=m= 0, we will just write p. ASP relies on the stable model
semantics to interpret negation [8]. Under the stable model
semantics programs may have several models and is defined as
follows. Let P be a propositional Datalog¬ program and S a set
of atoms. We denote by PS the Datalog program resulting from
P by (1) removing any clause, p :- p1, . . . , pn,notq1, . . . ,notqm,
from P such as there is an qi ∈ S, and by (2) dropping all
negative literals from the remaining clauses. For example, if
S = {q,r} and P is:
p :- r,not q.
q :- r,not p.
r.
(4)
Then PS is:
q :- r.
r. (5)
Definition 4.1: Let P be a Datalog¬ program and S be a
set of atoms. S is a stable model of P if and only if S is the
minimal model of the Datalog program Ps.
First note that the only stable model of any Datalog program is
its minimal model. Next note that a program can have 0, one
or many stable models. In the example above, S is a stable
model of P as is {p,r}, and the program {p :- not p} has
no stable model. In the ASP framework, this multiplicity of
models is used constantly to solve search problems.
An ASP-program solving search problem is generally struc-
tured in three parts [16]: (1) a generate, (2) a test and (3) a
define part.
1) Generate a superset of potential solutions. This is
achieved by using a choice rule mechanism that arbi-
trarily chooses sets of atoms. For example, the following
ASP-rule uses this mechanism.
{a,q} :- r. (6)
This rule can be intuitively interpreted as “if r is
included in the solution, i.e. in a stable model of the
program, then we need to choose a subset of {a,q} to
be part of the stable model as well”. Hence, the stable
model may contain the atom a, the atom q, both or none
of them. This is just syntax sugar for the set of rules:
a in :- not a out.
a out :- not a in.
q in :- not q out.
q out :- not q in.
a :- r,a in.
q :- r,q in.
(7)
This is one of several ways of translating (6)
into a logic program. Note that if r is added to
this program, the program has four stable models:
{r,a out,q out}, {r,a,a in,q out}, {r,q,a out,q in}
and {r,a,q,a in,q in}. The auxiliary atoms do not need
to be shown to the users, and the models are just listed
as {r}, {r,a}, {r,q} and {r,a,q}. In ASP, choice rules
can be annotated with a cardinality constraint as the
following example shows [17]:
{a,q}<= 1 :- r. (8)
This constraint restricts the stable models to models with
at most one atom from the set {a,q}. Thus, from our
previous example the stable model {r,a,q} is ignored
since it violates the cardinality constraint. In general, a
constrained rule is an expression of the form:
L≤ {r1, . . . ,rk} ≤U :−p1, . . . , pn,notq1, . . . ,notqm
where L ≤U are non-negative integers. And all stable
models containing fewer than L or more than U atoms
from {r1, . . . ,rk} are discarded.
2) The test part consists of eliminating potential “bad”
solutions by means of ASP constraint rules. These are
clauses with no head. For instance, adding the constraint
:- notq. (9)
to the rules in the previous example eliminates the stable
models in which q does not occur. Hence, the only
stable model of the program will be {r,q}. In general,
a constraint is an expression of the form:
:- p1, . . . , pn,notq1, . . . ,notqm
And every stable model making all ps true and all qs
false is discarded. Constraints can be implemented using
a regular clause as follows:
f :- p1, . . . , pn,notq1, . . . ,notqm,not f
with f being an atom not used in the remaining program.
This rule uses the fact that the program { f :- not f} has
no stable models.
3) The define part corresponds to Prolog-like rules. For
example,
r.
m :- s, t. (10)
are define rules.
To simplify notation ASP programs can use clause schemas
to represent a set of propositional clauses. As in non-
propositional Datalog, atoms in a clause schema are first-
order predicates of the form p(t1, . . . , tn), where each ti is
either a variable or a constant symbol, equality and inequality
constraints. In addition, at least one instance of every variable
appearing in a clause schema must appear in a positive literal
in the body of the clause. Clauses of this form are called safe.
For example, the following clause
p(X) :- q(X ,Y,Z),not r(Y ),Z= b
is safe since the three variables used in the rule appear in
q(X ,Y,Z). Note that if the body of the clause is empty the
clause cannot have variables. This restriction ensures that
the program can be transformed into a propositional logic
program by the so-called variable replacement or grounding.
The grounding of a clause schema generates all the instances
of the clause schema obtained by substituting every variable
with every constant appearing in the signature of the program.2
We will use choice rules to find ∆s and constrain the ∆s
to those that given P′1∪·· ·∪P′k∪∆′ satisfy `′1∧·· ·∧ `′k. Let us
start first by defining the P′i s. Let us first look at an example.
Take the frontier in Fig. 5. We have five sequents. We can
enumerate them from left to right and write the following five
programs:
P′1 = {b(1).}
P′2 = {b(2).}
P′3 = {c(3).}
P′4 = {c(4).}
P′5 = {}
In general, for a clause q1∧·· ·∧qk ⊃ p in Pi, we will have
p(i) :- q1(i), . . . ,qk(i) in P′i .
Correspondingly, `′i = `i(i). In our example, we then have
`′1 = ¬c(1), `′2 = a(2), `′3 = ¬b(3), `′4 = a(4), and `′5 = ¬a(5).
If we want all these literals to be simultaneously true in all of
our solutions then we need to add to our program the following
five constraints:
:- c(1).
:- not a(2).
:- b(3).
:- not a(4).
:- a(5).
Now we need rules for the generation of ∆. This is not
obvious since clauses in ∆ can be used by any of the Pis. Let
us first see how we decide which rules will be in ∆. Recall
from Lemma 3.1 that only Pis where `i is positive may need
rules in ∆ to prove `i, and that at most one rule in Pi for each
proposition in the language is needed. Hence, in our example
of Fig. 5 we need at most two rules for each atom for the
proofs of a in P2 and in P4. And a rule may have from 0
to as many as all the atoms in the language in its body. Let
us take a. The rules for a will be derived from the following
ASP-rule:
{rule4a(0,0),rule4a(0,1),rule4a(1,0),rule4a(1,1))} ≤ 2.
The idea here is that, for example, if the atom rule4a(0,1) is
in the stable model then ∆ will contain the clause c⊃ a. If the
atom rule4a(1,1) is in the stable model then ∆ will contain the
clause b,c⊃ a. We will pick no more than two rules and there
might even be 0 rules for a. We will have similar ASP rules for
the predicates rule4b and rule4c. ASP uses syntactic sugar to
compactly represent several atoms in the head of choice rule.
The choice rule can use schema variables to instantiate the
possible values of the atoms to choose to be part of for the
stable model. The domains of the variables are defined by extra
predicates added to the head of the choice rule. For example,
2In practice, this can be done more efficiently by some syntactic analysis
of the clauses.
the rule above can be equivalently written using the following
three ASP rules:
bool(0).
bool(1).
{rule4a(B,C) : bool(B),bool(C)} ≤ 2.
In this case the domain of both variables, B and C, in the
choice rule is defined by the predicate bool. Note that these
three rules are not equivalent to the rules:
bool(0).
bool(1).
{rule4a(B,C)} ≤ 2 :- bool(B),bool(C).
since the last clause schema represents the following four
propositional clauses:
{rule4a(0,0)} ≤ 2 :- bool(0),bool(0).
{rule4a(0,1)} ≤ 2 :- bool(0),bool(1).
{rule4a(1,0)} ≤ 2 :- bool(1),bool(0).
{rule4a(1,1)} ≤ 2 :- bool(1),bool(1).
In general for a language of n atoms, {p1, . . . , pn}, we will
have, for each atom pi, the ASP-rule:
{rule4pi(X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) :
bool(X1), . . . ,bool(Xi−1),bool(Xi+1), . . . ,bool(Xn)
}<= M.
where the Xis are distinct variables and M is the number of
positive `is in the frontier under consideration. Now we need
to make the connection between the rule4pi predicates and
the programs. Let us go back to our example. To generate the
rules for the atom a we will add the following five rules to
the ASP program:
a(X) :-
rule4a(B,C),
set b4a(X ,B),
set c4a(X ,C).
set b4a(X ,0) :-
p(X).
set b4a(X ,1) :-
b(X).
set c4a(X ,0) :-
p(X).
set c4a(X ,1) :-
c(X).
As in the P′i s, the argument in a represents in which of the
five programs a will be true in case the body of the rule is
true. Since this is a rule for ∆ this rule must be allowed to be
used by any of the five programs, hence, the use of a variable
X instead of a constant. Let us look at the rule more carefully.
If no atom rule4a is chosen, then there are no rules for a in
∆. Assume now that rule4a(0,1) has been chosen. We want
set b4a(X ,0) to be true for all values of X since we don’t
care whether or not b is true in Pi∪∆ for any i to make a
true. This is done by the use of the predicate p(X). We will
add to our program five atoms:
p(1).
p(2).
p(3).
p(4).
p(5).
For c, on the other hand, we need c to be true in Pi∪∆ if
we want a to be true in Pi∪∆. Hence the condition c(X) in
the body of the second rule set c4a is added to the body. In
our example that condition will make the body of the rule true
in P′3 and P
′
4. We will have similar rules with b(X) and c(X)
in the head (i.e. the left-hand side of the rule). In general, we
will add the atomic rules
p(1).
...
p(k).
to the program and a rule of the form:
pi(X) :-
rule4pi(X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn),
set p14pi(X ,X1),
...
set pn4pi(X ,Xn).
and 2(n−1) rules of the form:
set p j4pi(X ,0) :-
p(X).
set p j4pi(X ,1) :-
p j(X).
for every j 6= i. These rules complete the transformation. Take
F ∈ F (P,G) and denote by ASP(F) the transformation of F
into ASP rules. Let F = {P1 `Oˆ `1, . . . ,Pn `Oˆ `n}.
Theorem 4.1: There exists a ∆ such that P1∪∆ `Oˆ
`1, . . . ,Pn∪∆ `Oˆ `n if and only if ASP(F) has a stable model.
Proof: (Sketch) Follows directly from the definition in
[17] of the stable model semantics with cardinality constraints.
More generally, we can show that from every stable model
we can extract different ∆s for the frontiers.
All the examples in the paper have been implemented and
tested in the clingo ASP system [18]. The code in this section
can be copied verbatim and run in clingo version 4.4.0.
V. REGARDING APPLICATIONS
Becker et al. describe several practical examples where a
proof of validity can be used. They have an extended example
on probing attacks as well as mechanisms to do proofs for
meta-theorems. All these, of course, can be done using our
system, but given the fact that we are able to build ∆s we
are also able to expand the applications in other directions.
The process of guessing a ∆ to prove a permission can be
thought of as generating the credentials needed to obtain the
permission. This idea has been suggested independently by
Bonatti and Becker in the context of abductive reasoning (see
[19] and the references therein). We are doing, in essence,
abductive reasoning. Most of the work on abduction has been
done in the context of logic programs and it has been limited
to guessing atoms. We are departing from that since we are
abducing clauses as well. This has been possible because
we are dealing with policies and credentials represented as
positive logic programs (i.e. no negation is used. Negation
would make the process of abduction much more difficult).
Abducing clauses could help us to deal with credentials which
are more complicated than simple facts, such as being able to
generate rules that delegate the verification of credentials to a
third party.
Our algorithm for generating policies can also assist in prov-
ing other properties. For example, [20] describes a methodol-
ogy to check whether a distributed proof system preserves
confidentiality under probing attacks. In a distributed proof
system there is a finite set of principals P = {p1, . . . , pn}, and
each principal p j has a knowledge based, K j, represented by
a propositional Datalog program whose clauses can contain in
their bodies special propositional atoms of the form “pi says
f ” that are used to introduce delegations. To prove that this
atom is true two things must happen: (1) the atom f must
be proved by pi using its knowledge base, Ki, and (2) there
must be a delegation policy that allows pi to disclose f to
p j. More specifically, a delegation policy consists of a set of
inference rules that defines how to prove “pi says f ” using the
knowledge bases and possibly some auxiliary data (e.g. access
control lists). The method to check confidentiality is based on
the following definition of safe distributed proof systems.
Definition 5.1: Given a finite set of principals P =
{p1, . . . , pn} and delegation policy I, a distributed proof system
D[I] is safe if for every vector of knowledge bases KB =
〈K1, . . . ,Kn〉 and for every proper subset A of P , and for any
delegation of authority set Q over KB, there exists another
vector KB′, such that
1) The permissions that a principal in A can deduce from
KB and KB′ are the same.
2) Any delegation of authority that can be used from Q in
KB by any principal in A can also be used in KB′.
An example of delegation policy can be one for which each
Ki has atoms of the form release(p j, f ) meaning that principal
p j can infer “pi says f ” if f and release(p j, f ) can be proved
in Ki – the release(p j, f ) atom indicates that pi is allowed to
disclose to p j that f is true if pi finds a proof for f .
We first note that two of the three delegation policies studied
in [20] are directly translatable into Datalog clauses. The
third depends on the syntax of the clauses in the KBis and
a language independent translation might not be possible.
Writing a safety proof manually might not be easy. The
two proofs in [20] are done to delegation policies for which
finding a KB′ for any KB is possible by just adding atoms to
KB′. In general, as we have seen from our simple examples,
this might not be the case. I could be very simple but we
might need to add clauses to find KB′. Even though we
cannot offer an automatic proof for safety, we can offer a tool
that lets the administrator test scenarios that might lead to a
proof. For a given KB, the administrator can select a clause
A1∧·· ·∧Ak ⊃ A and run Alg. 3.2 with P = Q and G defined
as follows. Take the minimal model MKM of KM. For a set
A = {p1, . . . , pk} of principals from which the administrator
wants to show safety, let MKM|pi be the projection of MKM
over the facts that are deduced by principal pi.3 Then, let
G =
∧
ai∈MKM|pi ai ∧¬({A1 ; . . . ; Ak} ⊃ A). The algorithm will
try to find a ∆ that lets pi deduce exactly the same set of
permissions as the ones deduced from KB but ∆ 6= KB since
A1 ∧ ·· · ∧Ak ⊃ A 6∈ ∆. If ∆ does not exist another clause can
be selected. Note that instead of selecting a single clause
from KB we can select a subset and apply the transformation
from clause to goal to each clause, make a conjunction of
the individual goals and negate the conjunction. In this way
several clauses can be tested simultaneously.
VI. FINAL REMARKS
In this work we have presented a very operational definition
of validity in TMS. Based on this result, we have designed a
top-down proof procedure of validity. This procedure works
similar to abduction in logic programs with the addition that
not only atoms but also rules can be assumed in order to
find validity proofs. It would be possible to also describe a
model theoretic semantics based on Kripke structures follow-
ing Miller’s models. In particular, Miller interprets a world
of a Kripke model as a program and the knowledge at each
world as its minimal model. This intuition can be explained
in terms of two basic ideas of modal logic. The first one is
the notion that a world may be considered to represent the
“knowledge” that we have at a certain moment. The second
idea is that a formula can be considered to hold if we can infer
its truth from the knowledge that we have now or one that we
may acquire in the “future”, capturing the idea of credentials.
Details will appear in the full version of this paper [21].
An important consequence of the connections between
Miller’s language and the propositional logic for reasoning
in TMS is that we can reuse many results from logic pro-
gramming as is evidenced by the complexity results and the
implementation we have presented in this paper. Another
important and speculative consequence is the possibility of
lifting the results to policies, credentials and permissions with
variables and negation. We cannot directly apply Miller’s
results because his logic doesn’t deal with negation. There
is, however, the extension to Miller’s logic introduced in [11]
that deals with normal logic programs that we could use, but
we need to work out the details of the axiomatization since
3 [20] describes a fixpoint computation that let us get this set. We can also
use a technique similar to the one we use in our implementation of Alg. 3.2
to distinguish different sequents in a fronter to get the atoms in MKM|pi.
the approach in [7] uses a notion similar to Clark’s completion
as opposed to minimal models for negation. Complementary
to these extensions, we would also like to check how an
implementation of validity using our approach will compare
to the implementation of Becker et al.
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APPENDIX A
BECKER ET AL.’S PROOF SYSTEM
1) Axiom schemas:
` ϕ→ ϕ′→ ϕ (C11)
` (ϕ→ ϕ′→ ϕ′′)→ (ϕ→ ϕ′)→ ϕ→ ϕ′′ (C12)
` (¬ϕ→¬ϕ′)→ ϕ′→ ϕ (C13)
`γ(ϕ→ ϕ′)→γϕ→γϕ′ (K)
`γγ (C1)
`γϕ→ γ→ ϕ (C2)
`(p :-p1,...,pn)ϕ→ (p1∧·· ·∧ pn→ p)→ ϕ (DLog)
provided ϕ is -free
`γ¬ϕ↔¬γϕ (Fun)
`γ∧γ′ ↔γγ′ϕ (Perm)
2) Proof rules:
If ` ϕ and ` ϕ→ ϕ′ then ` ϕ′ (MP)
If ` ϕ then `γϕ (N)
If ` γ→ γ′ and ϕ is ¬−free then `γ′ϕ→γϕ (Mon)
